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ABSTRACT Sociological concepts of social disorganization, disintegration, social 
involution and social anomie offer relevant explanations of many developments 
in Serbia in the 1990s. However, if one relies only on such concepts, one will 
not get a comprehensive understanding of the extremely destructive developments 
that occurred simultaneous in practically all spheres of society (economy, politics, 
culture, and spiritual), and the long-lasting negative social developments that 
occurred even after the regime change in Serbia at the end of 2000. The author 
presents a more complex sociological concept, the concept of destroyed society, 
to describe ‘things’ that happen to society when its basic structure as an ordered 
social community is being destroyed.
The essential features of societal destruction include a radical, long-lasting 
disintegration of societal structure, the social system and societal culture, 
generating the destruction of society’s identity and vitality; the ‘empting’ of 
key social institutions (institutions of state, of the economy, policy, culture..), 
when institutions no longer carry out their institutionally-specific activities and 
degenerate into empty social forms; the prevalence of quasi and para-phenomena, 
which are outside regular social control and replace normal forms of activities 
established by institutions; the annulment and making of senseless basic social 
roles (occupations, professions, even roles in inter-personal relations); de facto 
making the system of social rules ‘out of order’, disrespect for the legal regulation 
of social development, an absence of morality; the life ‘behind the (public) scene’ 
becomes the real life of people, so that lies tend to dominate social communications; 
an accumulation of ‘unfinished happenings’, of activities which started but did 
not end, leading to the destruction of a sensible future; mass forgetting of ethics 
and morality which leads to widespread tolerance of inhuman doings; massive 
impoverishment, regression to low-level practices, even among members of 
society who usually would not be faced with poverty.
1  Silvano BOLČIĆ is retired  professor of sociology at the University of Belgrade, e-mail: 
sbolcic@yahoo.com
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Specific manifestations of the complete destruction of Serbian society in the 1990s 
are illustrated in the paper using empirically based findings2. Some comments on 
the possible reconstitution of destroyed Serbian society since the regime change 
are presented in the last part of the paper.
KEYWORDS destroyed society, destruction of institutions, determinants of 
societal destruction, reconstitution of society, Serbian society, post-socialist 
transition
In theoretical works of sociology, one can find references to society 
such as the following: reviews of historically-known formations of society; 
descriptions of the main forms of social change; of the stable functioning 
of society; of evolutionary and revolutionary components of social change; 
characterizations of social stagnation, involution, and social regression, of 
social disorganization, social disintegration and of social anomie (when 
developments in society become unpredictable, uncontrollable, due to the 
destruction of social values and rules). All these conceptual tools could 
be of use in understanding social developments in Serbia in the 1990s, for 
comparing them to developments in other countries, as well as for comparing 
recent and past events in Serbia as a society.
Specifically, concepts of social disorganization, disintegration, involution 
and social anomie certainly offer relevant explanations of many developments 
in Serbia in the 1990s. Still, by relying only on such concepts, one will not 
gain a comprehensive understanding of the multiplied, quasi-independent, 
extremely negative and destructive developments in practically all spheres 
of society (such as the economy, politics, culture, moral and the spiritual 
sphere, including the interpersonal relations of individual members of 
Serbian society) in the 1990s. Furthermore, by relying only on the usual 
meaning of these concepts it seems impossible to understand the key causes 
of the enduring, long-lasting and disturbing inefficiency of social action that 
has been prevalent in Serbia since the regime change in the fall of the year 
2000; action that was introduced with the intention of rebuilding institutions, 
reorganizing society, strengthening the role of the state, reestablishing the 
confidence of the public in the integrative agents of society such as church, 
school and cultural institutions, restoring faith in the “subjects” of socio-
systemic institutions, as well as rebuilding the trust of citizens in those who 
hold leading positions in society, who are now being chosen according to 
2  This paper is based on findings presented in S. Bolčić, Razaranje i rekonstitucija društva: 
Srbija na prelazu u 21. vek (Destruction and reconstitution of society: Serbia in transition to 
the 21st century), 2013, Beograd, Službeni glasnik.
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new, democratic electoral procedures and who are under public control. The 
problem is that all these concepts are related to some partial aspect of social 
reality, such as the problem with inappropriate regulation of the political 
sphere, of shortcomings of social organization, of a lack of morality and value 
confusion in society, with a presumed standpoint that society as such still 
exists, and that society has just lost its ability to intervene in a systemic way 
to stop or prevent undesired social development.
Considering all the features of negative social developments in Serbia in the 
1990s, the long-lasting destructive consequences of those developments and the 
persistence of the negative effects of those developments, in spite of a multitude 
of actions by internal and external social actors aimed at restoring social 
normalcy in Serbia it seems advisable to analyze these developments by using 
another, more complex sociological concept; the concept of destroyed society, 
which has not been used so far in the analysis of societal developments in Serbia 
in the 1990s, or in the analysis of other highly-disrupted contemporary societies. 
The current author introduced, for the first time, the concept of destroyed 
society in a discussion held within the Serbian Sociological Association in the 
fall of 1990. The concept was further elaborated in a paper published in Prošić 
–Dvornić, 1994; see also Bolčić, 1994.
It is important to stress that with this concept one describes things that 
are happening to society, whose basic features as an ordered social 
community are being destroyed. From the text which follows, one should 
grasp the heuristic value of this concept in the general analysis of destroyed 
societies, primarily for studying and understanding social developments in 
Serbia during the 1990s and afterwards. The author believes that the concept 
of “destroyed society” proposed here could also prove useful in the study 
of other “post-Yugoslav” societies, and some other contemporary societies 
which have faced severe social disruption due to their ‘internal’ (and other 
kinds of) wars. It is expected that this concept of destroyed society could 
be included in sociology’s theoretical tools, especially within that part of 
sociology that deals with processes of social dynamics to pinpoint the case of 
the disappearance of pre-existing global society.
Both in the lay person’s and in the sociologically-educated mind, there 
is a prevailing perception of society as something that “exists eternally”, 
regardless of specific social developments. Considering events in the distant 
past, people could possibly assume that some societies may have disappeared 
due to natural catastrophes, or that some civilizations (like the Roman, Inca 
and Maya civilizations) could have disappeared or could have be conquered 
by other civilizations, while the substantive causes of such disappearances 
of civilizations remain mainly unclear. One should mention that there are 
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relevant descriptions (see, for example, Tainter, 1988, Diamond, 2005) of 
many societies which have vanished from the map of human societies in the 
past centuries. It has been established in such studies that the fundamental or, 
at least crucial, causes of the decay of most of these vanished societies lay in 
their social constitution, particularly, in socio-systemic failures which were 
not observed and eliminated in time. As long as the decay of those societies 
resulted from the “wrong doings” of their key social actors, one can claim that 
these were cases of “destruction of society”, and not of the disappearance of 
society due to a natural catastrophe. Evidently, the “destruction of society” 
is not an unknown social phenomenon. The “novelty” proposed in this study 
is in the analytical conceptualization of this phenomenon and in the specific 
application of this concept to explain social developments during the 1990s 
and the early 2000s in Serbia, where the signs of “destruction of society” were 
clearly manifested and have been highlighted in numerous published works 
on sociology by the current author (see Bolčić, 2013). 
The very formation of society is a complex social process, but equally 
complex are the processes of its destruction, as are the factors in the 
reconstitution of a society. As with other areas of human life, where it is 
easier and faster to ruin or destroy things than to fix, improve or rebuild 
them, it seems that it was easier to enter the process of the “destruction of 
society” in Serbia in the 1990s than to come out of this stage afterwards. After 
considering this finding it may be stated that people in Serbia should have 
shown impatience while requesting that the processes of the “destruction of 
society” be stopped, but they should be reasonably patient in their expectations 
for a relatively quick reconstitution of society, and of the rebuilding of Serbia 
as a modern and successful society.  
It should be stressed that the concept of destroyed society is being used here 
as a concept of ideal-type analysis which has been elaborated in sociology 
by Max Weber (Weber, M. 1949). Such a concept, while requiring analytical 
insight into the phenomenological (“historical”) reality of society, does not 
assume full correspondence between this phenomenological reality and the 
“reality” which is being described by the use of the concept as a “generalized” 
(abstract) description of a given social reality. The ideal-type concept is a 
peculiar “mental construct”, by which real features of reality are “idealized” 
and “generalized” with the aim of making the given characteristics of reality 
more visible and apprehensible in their substance. Therefore the statement 
that a given “standing of society” is denoted as a “destroyed society” does 
not imply that all dimensions of society have been fully destroyed, nor that 
some manifestation of the destruction of society did not exist in the time 
before the given society fell into “destruction” – or that some manifestations 
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of the “destruction of society” were not features of societies which, according 
to “ideal-type” analysis, could not be denoted as “destroyed societies”. 
Considering some conditionality and the research limits of such an analysis, 
qualifying a given society as a “destroyed society” cannot be viewed as a 
subjective (in value terms, “pessimistic”) perception of social reality. The 
scientific validity of such a concept, and of findings based on this concept, 
should be judged by the “heuristic fertility” of such an analysis, by empirical 
findings and their reliability, as well as by the practical implications of the 
findings based on the concept of destroyed society.
ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF A DESTROYED SOCIETY
From the starting proposition that the “destruction of society” denotes 
the dominant features of the constitutive aspects of society in its totality, it 
follows that the features described below are the essential features of “social 
destruction”:
Radical disintegration of social structure, social system and societal 
culture, disintegration of a longer duration; an absence of visibly new 
integration by which a given society could regain its identity, its peculiar 
“social personality” and vitality;
“Emptying” of the key social institutions (state institutions, economic, 
regulative, cultural institutions and institutions of socialization), “emptying” 
of institutions of their institutionally specific activities, transformation of 
institutions into “empty social forms”, where there are no happenings that are 
substantively important to the everyday lives of people in the given society;
Annulment of and creation of senseless basic social roles such as 
occupational roles, professions, social functions, even roles in inter-personal 
relations such as the roles of parents, relatives, friends, etc.;
De facto putting the system of social rules “out of order”, and, in particular, 
disrespect for the legal regulation of social development, generalized 
disregard for legal rules, but also, “the forgetting of morality” in inter-
personal relations, leading altogether to a situation whereby normative social 
order becomes, in practice, irrelevant to the everyday lives of people in a 
given society; 
Living life “ behind the scenes” becomes normal practice for people (every 
member of society, both the most powerful and “ordinary” citizens, are 
compelled to hide, to cover up things they are doing); public life becomes, in fact, 
a “facade”, even a “masquerade”, preventing others from seeing what should 
not be known and seen, so that lies tend to dominate social communications;
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An accumulation of “unfinished happenings”, of activities (in the societal 
domain, as well as in the domain of individual doings) which started but did 
not end; the consequence being the elimination of perspective, the destruction 
of a sensible relationship with the future (people have no sensible answer to 
the question: What should I do today or tomorrow?);
Prevalence of “quasi” and “para-phenomena” instead of normal forms of 
activity that are established by institutions (quasi, or para-institutions, para-
organizations, etc.), which are outside regular social control;
“Normalization” of generalized malpractice that was considered 
inappropriate and illegitimate before the “destruction of society”, such as 
using public transportation without a valid ticket, using things which are 
someone else’s property, doing things that are considered good from the 
perspective of self-interest, disregarding the rights and benefits of others, 
destroying the lives of others, including taking someone’s life if it is in one’s 
own self-interest. 
Mass forgetting of ethics and morality (not, primarily, a “confusion of 
values”), which generates tacit, collective tolerance of inhumane doings, 
including killing innocent individuals, destroying houses, homes, the 
foundations of human existence of those who are not “on our side”, forced 
massive emigration, “cleansing” of territories, and similar wrongdoing;
Massive impoverishment, even of those members of society who would 
usually not be considered “poor”, but whose real quality of life has been so 
degraded in comparison to their previous living conditions that they consider 
their personal situation to be a state of de-civilization, as a regression to a 
lower standard of living. They leave behind, even forgot their former lives. 
 This analytical description of a “destroyed society” might be 
considered incomplete or unacceptable in all of the above-mentioned 
dimensions. Evidently, it is very difficult to make such a complex concept 
“operational” to meet the demands of a specific empirical investigation into 
the manifestations of the “destruction of society”. Respecting the limitations 
of the above-described concept of destroyed society, the following pages 
deal with some relevant findings which emerge from a detailed study of the 
“destruction of society” in Serbia in the 1990s and afterwards. This author 
believes that, even if they are not sufficient in all respects, these findings 
support the sociological assessment of society of Serbia in the past two 
decades (1990-2012) as destroyed; as a society which will have to go through 
a process of reconstitution – a more complex and a more difficult process 
than the process of “transition” and “post-socialist transformation” that other 
“post-communist” countries in East-Central Europe had to face. 
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DESTRUCTION OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF SERBIA
All available findings lead to the conclusion that, from the beginning of 
the 1990s, Serbian society did not have a well-formed social structure. On 
the social scene there remained at the same time greatly deconstructed parts 
of former social groupings (fragmented and socially degraded “working 
strata”, de-stratified peasants, a greatly de-structured middle strata, still 
relatively powerful fractions of the former “functionary class” or political 
bureaucracy), and a poorly-constituted new owner stratum (relatively 
numerous small entrepreneurs, a segment of peasantry who had been 
successful at commercializing production, owners of larger privatized former 
state enterprises, owners and managers of foreign firms located in Serbia). 
Considering this de facto “de-structured structure”, it seems improper to 
denote Serbian society during the 1990s as being a society with a system of 
restored capitalism, whose developmental “logic” would be generated by the 
newly re-established capitalist identity of Serbian society since the beginning 
of the 1990s. M. Lazić (2011) describes Serbian society since the 1990s as a 
society with a “blocked transition” from socialism to capitalism, and not as a 
case of clear “restoration of capitalism”.
An indicator of the situation of a “destroyed” Serbian society which 
reflects a social structure faced with the process of “de-structuring”, is its 
inability to create “great social coalitions” capable of comprehensive social 
action, as well as the impossibility of achieving a level of social consensus 
which is a necessary prerequisite for the articulation of a strategy of long-
term, successful “systemic” social action. One can also stress the inability of 
the key “structural actors“ to establish “social hegemony”, as described by A. 
Gramsci (1971). 
Since the end of the year 2000 in the Serbian political arena there have 
been so-called “impossible coalitions” (coalitions of former “Socialist” and 
political forces that were members of the so-called Democratic opposition of 
Serbia (DOS), coalitions of new social-democrats and advocates of neoliberal 
capitalism, coalitions of those in favor of the restoration of the monarchy and 
those advocating that Serbia be a constitutional “republic”, etc.). Of course, 
there are differences in the political programs of the parties who join these 
“impossible” coalitions, but these variations do not generate major conflicts 
of interest during the articulation of specific policies of societal governance. 
It seems that pre-existing political conflicts are greatly about taking control 
of the sources of state power, or are even created by the personal ambitions of 
members of the government. From the point of view of “ordinary” citizens, 
those “in power” have been prevalently greedy “selfish guys” who have used 
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power mainly for their own benefit. The selfishness of those in power in a 
destroyed society tends to be basically amoral, but presented in public as 
legitimate from some ideological (patriotic, religious, ethnically motivated) 
standpoint.
The de-structuring of actual Serbian social structure is also reflected in the 
real fragmentation and practical lack of legitimacy of the social elite. There 
were awkward public perceptions and characterizations of the elite in Serbia 
during the 1990s and even after the regime change in fall of the year 2000. 
In its basic conception, the “elite” has positive connotations, denoting those 
who are “elected” as the “best” or “excellent”. Of course, to be a member of 
the “elite” has involved having some benefits that “ordinary” members of 
society cannot have, like outstanding respect, recognition, great social power 
and more favorable chances in life, including some legitimate privileges. It 
is relevant to stress that the positive connotations associated with elite status 
assume that reaching the “apex” of the social pyramid cannot be achieved 
“overnight”, cannot happen without a demonstration of personal qualities, 
and should not involve moral or any other behavioral “stains” in the climb to 
“elite” status in the given society. 
Of course, in social reality, especially during the period of the “building 
of socialism” in Serbia, meritocratic principles were of variable relevance. 
In the years immediately after 1945, most of those in the elite stratum were 
respected for their positive roles in the battles for the liberation of the country 
from the Nazi occupation, for the elite’s contribution to the renewal of the 
destroyed country. The very climbing to the elite positions itself was in most 
cases gradual, was related to the successful fulfillment of public duties and 
was connected with impeccable individual personal morality. In subsequent 
years, following the “stabilization of socialism” many of the previously-
respected Party and State leaders become increasingly greedy and ignorant 
about the real interests of working people. Inclusion in the “nomenclature” 
meant assuming loyalty to the “first leader” of the Party.
In Serbian society, during the 1990s and afterwards, the “elites” were 
perceived by the public to be “social groupings” of variable composition and 
domains of activities. In the consciousness of most people, “elitism” lost its 
positive meaning. Even if not in every case, many of those “elite” were seen 
to be individuals who proclaimed themselves, or were proclaimed by some 
narrow clique, to be members of the “elite”. Quite frequently, they were and 
still are individuals with moral and other “stains” in their biographies, lacking 
many positive traits. The pronounced illegitimacy of great segments of the 
“new elite” affects negatively every successful individual whose success is 
also questioned. Consequently, this makes people’ “turn their back” on all 
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“structures of power” and leads to the withdrawal of public support for all – 
even positive – constructive leading forces in contemporary Serbian society. 
Even though there are a lot of new people who have assumed political roles, 
and despite many new governmental measures, social crises remain the 
enduring feature of “destroyed” Serbian society in the 21st century. 
THE DEFICIENCIES IN THE SOCIAL SYSTEM IN SERBIA 
SINCE THE 1990s
From the beginning of the 1990s, there were many changes in the Serbian 
social system. In Serbia, as well as in other former “socialist” countries, 
reforms aimed at replacing the former “socialist” system with a new “post-
socialist” social system (for some actors in those changes, the change had 
to be the restoration of a capitalist social system). Such fundamental social 
changes normally bring problems and difficulties to the society undergoing 
change. Some degree of “non-systemic” functioning of a given society 
seems to be unavoidable. Such features of the insufficient and inconsistent 
“systemic” regulation of a given society could be considered the normal price 
of transition, and not necessarily a sign of societal destruction. However, in 
Serbia in the 1990s and afterwards, besides the “normal” social difficulties 
caused by the replacement of the former “socialist” social system with a new 
“post-socialist” order, there were many fewer “normal” social developments. 
As first, there were numerous non-institutional activities, which were not 
of short duration. These non-institutional “doings” were observable in 
all societal domains. Specifically, socio-systemic changes in ownership 
relations, of the governance regime, and of the constitution of the central state 
government remained institutionally unfinished. In social reality, therefore, 
greatly incompatible social arrangements came into existence. From the 
1990s onwards, many of the former “self-managed work organizations” 
remained nominally in “social ownership” for years because they were 
neither privatized nor transformed into “state enterprises”. However, these 
organizations could not undertake the self-management of their’ employees 
(Molnar, 1996), nor could they appoint self-managing “bodies”. The 
management role was given to acting directors appointed by local authorities, 
but their management decisions were not controlled by employees in the firm 
or by any other institutionally-mandated body.
Contrary to the expected weakening of the role of the state, and a 
generally reduced influence for politics on the economy in Serbia (expected 
as a consequence of the post-socialist transformation), during the past two 
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decades there has been a de facto predominance of state governance and 
“political factors” have played a crucial influence on all spheres of social life. 
This feature of “system inconsistence” must have had negative effects on all 
social developments. This is both an indication and a cause of the societal 
destruction of Serbia in this period.
The “systemic” formation of a society as a normally institutionally-
arranged human community requires, besides other features, basically 
“congruent” social rules that are applied in various subsystems such as 
the economy, polity, culture and the spiritual sphere. It is assumed that the 
desired behaviors in one of the domains will be supported by practices in 
other spheres of social life. In Serbia during the 1990s and afterwards, due to 
the intentions of new social actors, some changes in the global value system 
were enacted, specifically in the new value placed on individualism (in 
contrast to the former “socialist collectivism”). This new “value paradigm” 
should have been supportive of the restoration of capitalist social relations, 
leading to the more efficient economic and overall social development 
of Serbia. However, due to the peculiar “ethno-nationalization of society” 
(Bolčić, 2013: 114-120), in an attempt to constitute Serbia as the Serbian state 
and society in an ethnic sense, in social reality, particularly in the sphere of 
politics and culture, “traditional collectivism” as a value orientation became 
of great importance, with an emphasis on serving the collective interests of 
the leading and constitutive (Serbian) nation, with the expectation that there 
would be a return to traditional patterns of collective life in the family, in local 
communities, and even in society in its totality. These “incongruent” value 
orientations had a negative impact on the overall social integration of Serbian 
society in that period.
Incongruent value orientations also existed in the domain of culture. On the 
one hand, people were expected to embrace patterns of behavior characteristic 
of developed “Western” societies; specifically, to follow fashion trends from 
the “West”, at least in their appearance in the public sphere. At the same time, 
they had to manifest their belonging to their “Serbian nation”, to demonstrate 
their respect for revived national mores, to show symbols of their belonging 
to the Serbian Orthodox church, etc. This attempt to behave simultaneously 
in accordance with “modern-time rules” and also in accordance with revived 
traditional Serbian values often had some grotesque results; e.g. when certain 
men with hair-cuts typical of “Rambo warriors” started wearing wooden cross 
necklaces typical of orthodox monks. Or, when women in short skirts and 
shirts, showing lots of flesh (typical of young “call-girls”), started wearing 
big golden crosses, normally worn by ladies with shirts buttoned up to their 
necks, when going to church. These are just illustrations of the prevailing 
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“non-cultural culture” which became one of the manifestations of the overall 
destruction of society of Serbia in the last two decades.
ON THE DESTRUCTION OF SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Every specific social institution has its peculiar functional domain and 
specific institutional functions. By their form, institutions can continue to 
exist even after they have lost their original functions. In such a case, people 
can treat these institutions as “habitual frames” which require some ritual 
behavior, or they can consider them to be senseless, “emptied social forms”. 
Institutions change through the introduction of new social rules under the 
influence of new social actors who emerge to control these institutions (for 
more on institutions and institutional change see Brinton and Nee, 1998). 
Some of these changes were so radical that they signified the formation of new 
institutions. During the processes of institutional change, one could expect 
some inconsistencies with institutional rules and the malfunctioning of such 
institutions. Such situations can be perceived by people as being situations 
of “social disorder”. Still, if such an episode of “institutional confusion” is 
short-lived, and basic social regulation is being provided for within and by 
appropriate institutions, global society may still be considered an ordered 
social “entity” where social developments are largely predictable. 
Fundamental destructive social change begins when institutions cease to 
fulfill their basic social function, when they become permanent “empty forms” 
and when the regulation of society occurs through various non-institutional 
forms, by some “quasi” or “para” institutions. “Quasi” or “para” institutions 
become visible in social reality under “names” similar to regular institutions, 
like “Coordinative body”, or “Serbian guard”. These “para-institutions” make 
“decisions” which regulate the behavior of people in the given domains such 
as in recruiting individuals for combat and other activities, such as collecting 
money to “help” people, etc. Some of the leading persons in such “para- 
institutions” may have roles in official institutions but these official institutions 
have not given formal authority to such individuals to take part in such “quasi” 
institutions. The “otherness” of these ‘para’ institutions, in comparison with 
normal institutions, is that they function according to “unknown rules”, through 
questionable legitimacy, using rules which protect some particular, illegitimate 
interests. The social power of actors that control these ‘para’-institutions is 
mostly lacking. Therefore, the overall destruction of social institutions occurs 
when the social power of certain actors becomes uncontrollable and when 
social “regulation” favors particular “private interests”.
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The destruction of the institutions of state is of crucial importance in 
the overall destruction of society. In Serbia, a specific “irregularity” in the 
functioning of the institutions of the state began before the dissolution of 
the Yugoslav federal state. Through the Constitution of Serbia, enacted in 
September 1990, the Republic of Serbia defined itself as an independent 
state, not explicitly as a “federal unit” of the Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (Pajvančić, 2005:20). From a legal perspective, this was a 
deviation in the normal functioning of the institutions of the state of Serbia. 
From that moment on there were many other social developments that 
lead to the gradual destruction of the institutions of state in Serbia, when 
many crucial state decisions were made by actors who were acting outside 
the regular institutions of the state. The de facto involvement of Serbia in 
“internal wars” (those in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo) assumed 
the compliance of the Assembly of the Republic of Serbia. In fact, there was 
no such concordance, and those de facto making such decisions acted outside 
regular state institutions. 
Since Serbia was involved in the “internal wars” within the borders of 
the former state of Yugoslavia, it should have been expected that the still-
existing institutions of the state in Serbia would enter a process of abnormal 
functioning, with the marginalization of the legislature and increased power 
for the executive. Since Serbia, as a state, was in a peculiar “state of war”, 
the increased stress on the repressive functions of the state were predictable. 
According to some findings, the police force of the Serbian state had 
increased from 25 000 at the beginning of the 1990s to almost 100 000 at the 
end of the 1990s. However, typical state decisions about the mobilization of 
military reserve forces and of the deployment of police and army units which 
were sent, informally and unofficially to “war zones” in Croatia and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, and many other decisions relevant to war activities, were 
made and enacted “extra-institutionally”, disregarding institutionally-defined 
procedures. Nominally, The President of Yugoslavia (Slobodan Milosevic) 
and an institutionally non-existent “Coordination body” (whose members 
were key politicians of Serbia, selected most probably by S. Milosevic) were 
making and enacting strategic and operative decisions for the Serbian state, 
claiming that such decisions, under the existing conditions, were needed 
to safeguard the vital “national interests” of the Serbian nation, dispersed 
throughout the former republics of Yugoslavia. Some non-state actors such 
as “citizens’ associations” made up of individuals willing to “volunteer” in 
protecting the life and “national interests” of the Serbs living in any part 
of the former Yugoslavia were also involved in “defense activities”. Such 
associations had even their “para-military” units which were “sent into 
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defense actions” in “coordination” with the authorized state organs, but 
often following the independent decisions of the “leading organs” of such 
associations. Evidently, such “extra-institutional” activities contributed to the 
degradation of regular state institutions and, consequently, to the destruction 
of the institutions of the Serbian state. One can claim that in such a social 
context a group of nominal state functionaries became private possessors 
of the state and made state decisions “in the name” of Serbian citizens. N. 
Dimitrijević (2004: 58-59) states that in Serbia during the 1990s there existed 
“a system of privatized governance”. The consequences of such decisions 
were generally tragic for the citizens of Serbia, for people in other parts of 
former Yugoslavia, and, in the long-run, for the future of the Serbian state 
and society.
During the times of destruction of state institutions, a widespread disrespect 
for law and all other legal rules becomes “normal”, first through disrespect for 
those with state power, but then through general disrespect for the “ordinary” 
citizens of such a state. As confirmed by survey findings  (Bolčić, 2013:151) 
carried out during the years of the “destruction of society” in Serbia, the 
majority of people in Serbia agreed that the laws that existed in the 1990s 
were less well respected than before the 1990s. Two thirds of respondents 
considered this disrespect for law to be a precondition of survival, and as 
legitimate if it proved crucial for safeguarding someone’s interests. Such 
findings warn that under peculiar “irregular” socio-structural conditions, like 
widespread pauperization and the lack of provision of basic goods for living, 
most individuals in such a “destroyed society” tend to become “offenders”. 
Although undesired, even “ordinary” citizens can this way contribute to the 
“destruction of society”, which is not in their fundamental interest.
The normalcy of any society greatly depends on its normality in terms of the 
functioning of its economic institutions, whose social function is to mobilize 
and activate disposable economic resources, to ensure the production and 
exchange of goods and services needed to ensure a civilized way of life for 
people in a given society. Economic institutions tend to exist and function 
even when there are major social “disturbances” in other spheres of society, 
particularly in politics. It is known, for example, that during wars between 
states, most enterprises continue to function (Milward, 1977).
In Serbia during the 1990s there were some “expected” disorders in the 
functioning of economic institutions, partly caused by changes in the 
economic system by the transformation of ownership relations. Some general 
malfunctioning of the Serbian economy also resulted from the economic 
sanctions imposed by the UN and other international bodies, provoked 
by the involvement of Serbia in the “Yugoslav wars”. Considering these 
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circumstances, one should say that the disturbance in the functioning of 
economic institutions in Serbia was accentuated due to the overall destruction 
of Serbian society. It should be mentioned that, in Serbia during the 1990s, 
there were numerous work organizations, enterprises, shops, etc., which 
could only nominally be denoted as “places of business”, where people 
actually worked and had some function. People were “employed” in factories 
which had no production; they went to retail shops which had no goods to 
sell. Banks ceased to be “financial institutions” as they could not provide 
financial services for their business partners, nor could they make it possible 
for depositors to save and withdraw their money when they needed it.
At the time when regular economic institutions were ceasing to fulfill their 
normal institutional functions, a “mushrooming” of “para” firms doing “extra-
institutional” business in the “grey market” occurred (goods were offered for 
sale on the street, on car hoods; street “dealers” provided “financial services” 
by exchanging foreign currencies, lending money, offering to informal 
depositors some interest on their “deposits” and basic financial transactions 
were conducted not in the official currency – the dinar – but in the German 
mark). Due to such severe destruction of economic institutions (Dinkić, 1995), 
the state lost its capacity to use normal state measures in order to regulate 
economic life in Serbia. This resulted in a widespread scarcity of various, 
even basic, provisions. Such goods could most often be found in the “grey 
market” where prices could not be controlled by the state; as a result, prices 
sometimes increased several times during the day. This was one of the causes 
of galloping inflation and of the devaluation of the purchasing power of the 
official currency. State institutions even became “participants” in the non-
legal provision of various goods (e.g. gasoline, “strategic goods” needed by 
state institutions, etc.) Due to international economic sanctions, such goods 
as were needed for “state purposes” had to be supplied by unofficial suppliers 
(i.e. privately owned firms). These “services” provided by private firms to 
the state were often generously paid for, sometimes “in kind”, and through 
non-disclosed “favors”, creating a structural base for all kinds of corrupted 
relationships between private suppliers and state officials. The provenance 
of the “first millions” (in those years, expressed in German marks) of many 
big businessmen was not later described, for they were not pressed to explain 
how they had accumulated such sums, although it appears that the money 
was made during those years of the social destruction of Serbia. It seems self-
evident that a society where corruption affects all the key social activities in 
such a fundamental way cannot be anything other than a destroyed society in 
the substantive meaning. 
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Galloping inflation was perhaps the most disturbing sign of the overall 
destruction of society in Serbia during the 1990s. While in 1989 prices grew 
by 195%, in the year 1992 prices were growing at an annual 9000%. By 
the end of 1993 and at the beginning of 1994 the rate of inflation had to be 
calculated on a daily basis: in January 1994 inflation was 60% daily, even 2% 
per hour (Dinkić, 1995:43).
Considering all these facts, it was inevitable that Serbian society would 
become a profoundly pauperized society. According to the official statistical 
findings, 14% of all people were poor in 1990, 39% in 1994, and 33% in 
1999 (Pošarac, 1995). In a survey study (Bolčić, 2002) conducted in the year 
2000, only 1% of respondents reported that their living standard was “good”, 
while 78% answered that their situations in life were “hardly bearable”, or 
“unbearable”.
Processes of the destruction of institutions were visible even in the functioning 
of religious institutions. The 1990s were certainly the years of the revival of 
religiosity and the uptake of overtly-religious behavior, especially in relation to 
the baptizing of children, marriage, burial ceremonies, the celebration of religious 
holidays, as well as in the display of one’s religious orientation through wearing 
crosses and the display of religious objects such as icons, etc., in one’s home 
(see findings, Radisavljević-Ćiparizović, 2002). The 1990s were also years of 
increasing influence for churches as institutions and church dignitaries became 
more visible in wider public life, including political life, in Serbia. Considering 
such facts, it would seem inappropriate to claim that there was a trend towards 
the destruction of religious institutions. However, if one has in mind the original 
and specific functions of religious institutions; i.e. strengthening the spiritual 
orientation of people and their religious beliefs3, then the actual “doings” of 
religious institutions cannot be said to be in accordance with their specific 
institutional functions. “The word of the church” was often heard in relation 
to non-church and non-religious matters, about the state and political activities, 
and was not heard in relation to the condemnation of various inhumane, non-
Christian activities (such as torturing or killing people, taking other people’s 
property, amoral behavior in various situations, including the amoral behavior 
of the “people of the church”). While men of the church expressed discontent 
with the general spiritual situation in Serbian society, asking for greater social 
influence for religious institutions, they often overlooked their contributions 
and their malpractice, as opposed to working to establish a desirable, proper 
spiritual situation in Serbian society.
3  According to findings presented by D. Radisavljević-Ćiparizović (2002: 123-131), only 2% of 
the population surveyed regularly attended liturgy in their churches.
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In elaborating the features of destruction of Serbian society during the 
past two decades, one needs to underline some developments related to 
interpersonal relations in this society and to the peculiarities of the modal 
type of personality that prevailed in Serbia in that period. In sensing the 
destruction of society, people often felt society vanishing behind their back. 
They also lost their friends and others close to them. They were aware that 
it was hard to find those who would help and support them in their everyday 
lives. A survey (Milić, 2002:262) carried out in 1999 showed that 46% of 
respondents had fewer friends than before 1990. In some cases this loss of 
friends was affected by the massive emigration of people during this period 
(Bolčić, 2013:231).  
In explaining these undesired changes in interpersonal relations and the 
shaping of a “modal personality” (for more on this, see Golubović, 1995: 8-9) 
it is important to underline the socio-structural circumstances generated by 
the process of destruction of society that entailed” such changes. It becomes 
normal that an individual “thinks most of himself” in most everyday situations 
and looks for personal gain even when this means overlooking the needs and 
rights of others. In the above-mentioned survey study, 65% of all respondents 
admitted that they “thought mostly of themselves” in those years, while 57% 
of the respondents agreed with the statement that in those years people were 
“less honest” than in the pre-1990 period. This disregard for morality was 
one of the manifestations of a destroyed society and may highlight the reason 
why people all over the former Yugoslavia were “inactive” in condemning the 
unquestionably inhumane doings of many individuals that took part in war 
activities in the area, and who did not express their disapproval about forms 
of criminal activities that made the lives of the majority of citizens of Serbia 
miserable.
In a society, where, by necessity, there is widespread disregard for moral 
rules, where there is considerable tolerance for amorality, one should expect 
weak motivation for civil action and a lack of all those activities in which 
autonomous persons, moved by their consciences, attempt to improve the 
overall quality of life of other members of society. According to some findings 
(Bolčić, 1999), this peculiar mode of destruction of civil society has also been 
a manifestation of the general destruction of society during the 1990s. 
The hitherto-presented findings concerning the social situation in Serbia 
during the 1990s should be treated as just the first illustration of the manifest 
destruction of Serbian society.
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ON THE CAUSES OF THE DESTRUCTION OF SOCIETY
The starting point for this study is that the processes of the destruction of a 
society generate very profound, long-lasting disorders in the functioning of a 
given society. The destruction of Serbian society at its root continued after the 
regime changes in Serbia in October 2000, in spite of significant attempts to 
stop those sinister social developments. Even if one makes a more systematic 
analysis of social developments in Serbia after the end of 1990, there are 
numerous indications which suggest that, since the year 2000, manifestations 
of the destruction of society have continued to be an essential component of 
Serbian social reality. Those who took leading roles in Serbian society after 
the dethronement of Milošević in the fall of 2000 were quick to admit that 
they were not aware of how profoundly destroyed all the social institutions 
in Serbia were. They had to learn painfully that neither their enthusiasm nor 
their expertise were sufficient to create prompt and substantive social changes 
in Serbian society, which continued to be heavily influenced by the negative 
consequences of social developments in the 1990s.
Among the circumstances that contributed to the destruction of society one 
should primarily pinpoint “war developments”, especially the case of “internal 
war”. One can learn from various historical precedents that societies facing 
“civil” or “internal wars” experience the most fierce confrontations, greatest 
destruction and atrocities, and even periods of de-civilization of longer 
duration. Therefore, in the search for circumstances that might have caused the 
process of the destruction of Serbian society, one should consider war on the 
territory of the former Yugoslavia, with Serbia being part of that country. Even 
if neither the state nor the society of Serbia had declared war on any other part 
of Yugoslavia, it is undeniable that both the state and the society of Serbia were 
deeply involved in the development of fighting in the “area of Yugoslavia”. 
Those war confrontations have most often been defined as “civil”, “inter-
ethnic” or even “inter-religious” war(s). If one considers the various “sides” 
involved in war activities, they cannot simply be defined as ethnicities, for in 
some cases the battle grounds witnessed even regular military formations of the 
newly-independent states constituted within the borders of former republics of 
Yugoslavia. Thus it seems more appropriate to qualify those wars within the 
borders of the former Yugoslavia as internal wars.
Involvements in such “internal wars” provoked deep disorder in the 
functioning of all the social institutions in Serbia, primarily in the functioning 
of the institutions of state. These institutions, influenced by changing 
situations in war zones, and even more by the way institutions were used 
by leading functionaries of the state, ceased to be institutions under proper 
20 SILVANO BOLČIĆ 
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY  2 (2014) 
institutionally-defined social control. Afterwards, these institutions were 
either marginalized (this being the case of legislative and judicial institutions), 
or put under the peculiar “private control” of the highest-ranking state official 
and his unofficially appointed “collaborators” who presumed that they had an 
unlimited “mandate” from the Serbian nation to use state means to secure and 
promote the interests of the Serbian nation. So, the destruction of society is an 
outcome of the involvement of a given society in an “internal war”, and also 
of a peculiar “privatization” of state institutions.
The institutionally irregular “dissolution” of the SFR Yugoslavia 
contributed greatly to various disorder in the functioning of the newly-
constituted “republic-states” and also in the newly-constituted “republic-
societies”. These newly-established “independent” states promptly underwent 
a new “constituting” and redefining of the state’s social identity. Since the 
“ethnic problem” was perceived by most of the “new forces” as the crucial 
unresolved problem of the former Yugoslavia, the post-Yugoslav states and 
societies were re-constituted as ethnic states, as the states of the dominant 
ethnicity within the borders of the former Yugoslav republics. It seems just 
to conclude that such an “ethno-national” constitution for the new post-
Yugoslav societies led to numerous inter-state conflicts, to hostile relations, 
including war. One should know that the former republics of Yugoslavia were 
not ethno-nationally homogeneous: 91% of the citizens of the Republic of 
Slovenia declared themselves to be Slovene; other republics contained up to 
30-40% citizens of an ethnicity other than the dominant one in that republic. 
With the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the Serbs became the most numerous 
ethnicity (totaling 2 million) “left out” of “their ethnic state” (i.e. Serbia). It 
is important to stress that, at least in relation to the constitutional intention, 
the former Yugoslav republics were not ethno-nationally constituted social 
entities. According to the Constitution of SFR Yugoslavia, Serbs, Croats, 
Slovenes, Macedonians, Montenegrins, and Bosnians had the status of 
“constitutive nations” in Yugoslavia and in all former Yugoslav republics. 
Because of the “ethno-national” constitution of the new post-Yugoslav 
states, considerable segments of those “constitutive nations” lost that status, 
becoming “ethnic minorities”, which most of them could not accept, either as 
individual citizens, or as a collectivity of a given former “constitutive nation”. 
The consequence of such sentiments made the new post-Yugoslav states 
states with limited legitimacy whose considerable number of citizens rejected, 
at least consciously if not actively, their loyalty to such a state. These citizens 
felt deprived of some of their former rights; they felt they were second-rate 
citizens, disbelieving that the good will of such an “ethnically biased state” 
would lead to them being treated equally, and fearing that their civil and 
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human rights would not be secured – particularly fearing unfair treatment 
related to their “ethnic needs”.  
It should be expected that a society, lacking a consensus around the basic 
constitution of its state, will become a society of deep cleavages and tensions. 
This generates inefficiency and the speedy “ruining” of all social institutions. 
Therefore, the inter-ethnic conflicts were just one side of this “ethno-national” 
constitution of the new post-Yugoslav states and societies. There were also 
severe and destructive social developments that affected the everyday lives of 
the people in those territories. These were more severe in those “ethnic states” 
which were multiethnic to a greater extent. The ethno-national constitution of 
the new post-Yugoslav states generated the “ethno-national” formation of new 
societies in this region, expressed in the tendency to treat society as property 
of the dominant “ethno-nation” (Bolčić, 1995). This meant establishing 
a basic identity for a given society, its social order and its socio-systemic 
goals in direct service to the dominant ethno-nation. An “ethno-nationalistic” 
society is socially structured along ethnic lines, making all other divisions in 
society of a secondary importance. Not only state governance but also power 
relations in social terms have to be in accordance with the socio-systemic 
realization of interests of the dominant ethno-nation. All other components 
of the social, economic, political, cultural and spiritual spheres of a given 
society should be formed along these “ethnic lines”. 
Radical deviation from respect for basic human values, due to the 
pronounced socio-systemic biased treatment of any activities considered 
favorable for the leading ethno-nation, resulted in a peculiar disregard for 
morality, followed by an en masse breaking of legal rules, by the widespread 
criminalization of society, by frequent inhumane actions directed not only at 
individuals who belonged to ethnic group(s) with which the given society had 
hostile relations, but also to those individuals of the same ethnicity who were 
considered to be disloyal toward their ethnicity. If one takes into consideration 
the real multi-ethnicity of the new post-Yugoslav societies and the destructive 
consequences of the “ethno-national” constitutions of such societies, it is 
inevitable to conclude that just this process of “ethno-nationalization” of 
all post-Yugoslav societies, and Serbian society in particular, contributed 
in a fundamental sense to the destruction of society in the area of former 
Yugoslavia.
When analyzing the social circumstances that could have contributed to 
the process of destruction of society, one should not forget the long-lasting 
economic crises both in the former Yugoslavia and in Serbia as well. These 
caused widespread pauperization of the inhabitants of this country. It is 
important to stress that “pauperization” in this case did not solely occur 
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to individuals with very low incomes, already struggling to meet basic 
existential needs, but to masses of former citizens who had respectable living 
standards and who “overnight” had to radically reduce their living standards 
and to go through a process of ‘de-civilization’. Individuals, in some cases 
unemployed and unpaid during the 1990s for years, lacked basic existential 
means and resorted to being selfish and “forgetting about their society” as 
they looked for ways to solve their problems, along the way disrespecting 
regular institutions and disrespecting legal rules. A massively pauperized 
society cannot be a well-ordered society in which institutions and individuals 
act in accordance with their social roles. Therefore, under the given socio-
structural conditions, even “ordinary” citizens can contribute, through their 
activities, to the destruction of society. Of course, their impact on this process 
is not autonomous. More relevant are the activities of powerful social actors 
who decisively contribute to the formation, functioning and destruction of 
social institutions and to the functioning of the social system in its totality.  
In the preceding analysis of the social circumstances which could have 
precipitated the processes of social destruction several circumstances were 
mentioned, but none of them can be characterized as “decisive”. In the case 
of Serbia during the 1990s, the destruction of society was most probably a 
result of the simultaneous impact of a “multitude of factors”. Of course, some 
of those circumstances preceded other circumstances: i.e. the long-lasting 
social and economic crises in Yugoslavia were severe and destructive since 
the beginning of the 1980s. “Economic instability” seems to have been the 
crucial reason for the widespread popular dissatisfaction in Yugoslavia during 
the 1980s; this was qualified as ”economic instability” by the leading political 
and state organs of Yugoslavia. At the beginning of 1982, the Presidency of 
Yugoslavia appointed the Commission for the long-term program of economic 
stabilization, presided over by the President of The Presidency (Sergej 
Krajger). A group of leading sociologists, coordinated by the current author, 
was asked to prepare a document about the “social aspects of the program 
of economic stabilization”. In that document, the sociologists characterized 
the social situation in Yugoslavia as a situation of social crisis, not just as a 
situation of “economic instability”, proposing radical socio-systemic changes 
as a way to overcome even the problems with economic instability. At the 
time this assessment from the sociologists was not accepted by the leading 
politicians in Yugoslavia, including the politicians in Serbia, although there 
was no direct opposition to it (the statements of the sociologists are reported 
in Scientia Yugoslavica, No. 4-5, 1985, Zagreb). 
Discussions about the necessary measures for economic stabilization 
opened up a confrontation between the “leading figures” of various republics, 
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expressed mainly as a dispute about relations in the Federation. Leaders of 
some republics, specifically those in Slovenia and Croatia, blamed federal 
institutions for enacting inappropriate economic policy measures, for 
creating inappropriate investment policy and poorly regulating the economic 
contributions of republics to the Federal funds (that were mainly distributed 
to the less-developed parts of Yugoslavia). Some leaders (in Serbia and also 
some less-developed republics) advocated a “stronger Federation”; others 
were in favor of greater independence in the activities of the state organs in 
the republics: i.e. of a “weaker Federation” or “asymmetrical” Federation. 
Although the republics of the former Yugoslavia were not constituted as 
“ethno-national states” but as “socio-political communities” of all the citizens 
living in the territories populated mostly by the citizens of a given ethnicity, 
the cleavages concerning the “relations in the Federation” were felt to be 
“nation-based” (ethnic) in Yugoslavia because of their conflicting “national 
interests”. One could have predicted  that this “ethnic” articulation of conflicts 
of representatives of the nations would provoke the rise of national sentiments 
of “ordinary” citizens, the rise of a massive sense of frustration from members 
of the given ethnicities, the revival of national ideologies and even some 
preparatory activities for safeguarding the vital interests of the “nations” if 
endangered by other “nations”. 
It must be stressed that in their discussions about the relations in the Federation, 
the politicians of the republics avoided qualifying their own positions, as well 
as the positions of others taking part in discussions, as “ethnically-biased”, or 
favorable to the interests of a certain “constitutive nation”. All positions that 
were made overt were expressed in terms of advocating further development 
of a “self-management” mode of governance in all segments of Yugoslav 
society and the making of efforts in favor of modernizing and democratizing 
Yugoslavia. It looks as if the media and the “creators of the public opinion” 
played a major independent role in the revival of national sentiments, evoking 
bad memories of previous ethnic clashes. Among “ordinary” citizens there 
remained the prevailing perception that, all in all, the inter-ethnic relations 
in each of the republics, and in Yugoslavia in general, were good (see Lazić, 
1991). Even the problems and cleavages that were expressed were perceived 
as only being resolvable within the existing constitutive framework of 
Yugoslavia as a multi-ethnic state and a multi-ethnic society. Well, in spite of 
those prevailing feelings among “ordinary” citizens, most of whom did not 
foresee any threatening conflicts, real social developments took a different, 
tragic path towards “resolving” those conflicting “demands” for redesigning 
the Federation through war within the borders of the former republics and 
within the borders of the former Yugoslavia.
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Searching for an explanation for the tragic course that was taken to 
resolve the Yugoslav crisis of the 1980s, one has to consider the role of 
specific powerful social actors (bureaucracies in republics, leading military 
cadres, nationalistic segments of the cultural elite) who played an important 
role in the final characterization of the essence of the state and the social 
problems in Yugoslavia at the end of the 1980s, and who, in making strategic 
decisions, tried to resolve the problems. There is also another phenomenon 
that should be considered more fully. Namely, the long-lasting social crises, 
clearly manifested at the beginning of the 1980s, that caused massive social 
discontent with a worsening of individual living standards, and even more, 
discontent with the crying inefficiency and incapacity of “politicians” to 
define measures that would resolve existing social and state problems. These 
contributed to the formation of a social atmosphere in which demands for 
quick, decisive solutions were accentuated. Such an atmosphere was fertile 
ground for the “demand” and also for the “supply” of political actors who 
had (or pretended to have) the necessary qualities and the ability to take 
prompt and decisive action to overcome disturbing social problems. Even if, 
from some superficial insight, one might come to the conclusion that some 
of the key contributors to the tragic developments in the given “destroyed 
society” somehow “self-elected” themselves to these leading positions, one 
should not forget the socio-structural context that enabled such individuals to 
assume the leading roles, and one must also be aware of a multitude of actors, 
visible and invisible, supporting the activities of these key historical figures. 
Emphasizing this “side of the story” should not mean undermining the fact of 
the real role and responsibility of some of the key political figures in starting 
and maintaining the processes of the overall destruction of the given society.
The role of personality must be considered in this attempt to understand the 
process of social destruction of Serbia during the 1990s. Even if significant 
investigation is needed in order to understand the essential social circumstances 
which lead to the destruction of the society in Serbia, it seems to be a reliably-
established fact that Slobodan Milošević, in the role of the President of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, played an essential and sinister role in the 
initiation and “stabilization” of the processes of “destruction of society”; i.e. 
both of the multi-ethnic Yugoslav society and of newly-constituted Serbian 
society.
Without attempting to undertake a comprehensive analysis of S. Milošević’s 
actions in regard to social developments in Serbia in the last two or three 
decades (since the 1980s), in the context of this analysis of the destruction of 
the Serbian society, particular attention will be given to his contribution to the 
processes of destruction of Serbian social institutions. It is relevant to know 
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that some of his activities that contributed to the later destruction of social 
institutions in general started at the beginning of the 1980s; that is, before 
the final “dismantling” of Yugoslavia as a multi-ethnic federal state, and also 
before the beginning of war activities in the “Yugoslav area”. One might say 
that, in a symbolic sense, “the Milošević era” was announced on the poster 
for the 10th Congress of the League of Communists of Serbia (1986); the 
poster with a characteristic strong fist that was displayed when Milošević 
was elected President of the Central Committee of the Serbian Communist 
League. Soon after, he was “enthroned” as the most powerful politician in 
Serbia, S. Milošević undertook activities designed to “unravel” the social 
crises in Yugoslavia, as well as in Serbia (see, Milošević,1989; the title of the 
book in Serbian is Rasplitanje krize; in English, The Unraveling of Crises). 
Unfortunately, his contributions to the “unraveling” of the “Yugoslav crisis” 
led to the “dismantling” of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
to the final destruction of the state of Yugoslavia and to a series of sinister 
developments in all parts of Yugoslavia. The destruction of society of Serbia 
is one of the sinister results of S. Milošević’s “unraveling” of social crises of 
the 1980s in Yugoslavia. 
The new “style” of S. Milošević’s political activities was characterized 
as determination, prompt action, firm unity (not only within the Party, but 
also in society), which had to be achieved even if meant disregarding usual 
institutional procedures. This new “style” was visibly demonstrated in the 
way S. Milošević performed his role of President of the Presidency of the 
Central Committee of the LCS (for more on this, see Pavlović, 1988:42, 
45 and 63). What is relevant here is the conflict within the Presidency of 
the Central Committee between S. Milošević and D. Pavlović, President 
of the Party Committee of Belgrade, which ended with the ousting of D. 
Pavlović from all the “Party” bodies and from the “Party” itself. The mode of 
resolving this “intra-Party” conflict, also witnessed in Milošević’s subsequent 
activities in “resolving” other social “situations” in Yugoslavia and Serbia, 
clearly indicated his disrespect for institutional arrangements. Also, this 
superficially-characterized “intra-Party” conflict demonstrated a new Serbian 
“ethno-national” policy, which inevitably led to the destruction of Yugoslavia 
as a multi-ethnic state and society. 
S. Milošević was explicit in his advocacy of non-institutional methods of 
resolving social issues: “But the solution will not come through procedure, 
its small and big traps, small and big trickeries, intrigues and wiles. The 
solution will provide the policy chosen by the majority of people of this 
country, institutionally or non-institutionally, according to the statute or 
against the statute, on the street, or inside, in a populist or elitist way, with 
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arguments, or without arguments; in any case it should be clear that this will 
be in accordance with the politics for Yugoslavia in which we will live in a 
more united way, we will be treated more equally, become wealthier and more 
cultured” (Milošević, 1989:333). The real effects of such a “policy” became 
more and more damaging in all domains of life in Yugoslavia and Serbia. 
Among those “deserving recognition” for the destruction of society one can 
hardly question the leading position of Slobodan Milošević.
ON THE RECONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY SINCE 
OCTOBER 2000
It has been mentioned that the processes of social destruction are complex 
processes of a longer duration, generated by many actors and factors. 
Therefore, it was unrealistic to expect the immediate reconstitution of society 
in Serbia after the dethronement of the “old government” and the electoral 
victory of anti-Milošević’s forces in the autumn of 2000. Of course, there 
were some positive developments: positions in state institutions were mostly 
taken up by persons selected through free and fair democratic elections. The 
living standards of the majority of citizens slightly improved. The share of 
the “grey economy” decreased. In 1995, it was assessed (Krstić, 1998) that 
unregistered income in the grey economy accounted for some 50% of GDP; in 
2010, the grey economy was assessed at 30% of GDP (Madžar, 2013). Most 
of the economic life since autumn 2000 has returned to the usual legal forms 
and institutions. Still, many of the above-mentioned features of a destroyed 
society have continued to exist in Serbian society since the year 2000. The 
activation of disposable domestic economic resources (both material and 
human resources) has been insufficient. Retail trade activities and financial 
transactions have been revived mostly owing to the liberalization of foreign 
investments and financial and trade activities. However, because of this 
“model” of economic revitalization there has been a great increase in the 
external debt, the undervaluation of the de facto domestic currency, and the 
number of unemployed has continued to rise. 
In the political domain, in the socio-systemic building of the state and 
society, there are still many “unfinished” developments. Most of the issues 
concerning the state borders after the dissolution of the Yugoslav state are still 
open. From the socio-structural perspective, Serbian society continues to be 
very fragmented and has an elite whose legitimacy is still in question. Under 
such conditions, state institutions continue to inefficiently carry out their 
functions, especially in terms of making proper, socially-accepted strategic 
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decisions. People continue to see that key political decisions are being taken 
outside of the appropriate institutions. In spite of some improvements in 
living conditions, most citizens subjectively perceive their situation to be 
similar to what they experienced in the 1990s. In terms of public reactions, 
one can continue to speak of a “moral” crisis, of widespread selfishness, of 
corruption, of low trust in institutions and of a need to “evade the legal rules” 
in securing one’s essential personal interests. In such a social atmosphere 
social and individual perspectives are unclear. A great number of young 
people still see their future as somewhere abroad, and the “brain drain” trend 
that started in the 1990s continues.   
The transformative changes that have occurred since October 2000 have 
ensured a rapid turnover of personnel at the apex of the social pyramid, not 
a radical change in the strategic orientation of state and social building of 
Serbian society. There has been a break with the Milošević regime through 
the replacement of a greatly autocratic governance with a more democratic 
governance; through the formation of a more responsible executive branch 
of government; through the abandonment of the policy of confrontation 
with the rest of the world, by enhancing cooperation with the “international 
community”, and by building less hostile relations with neighboring states; by 
substituting the dominant state-social ownership of the means of production 
mostly with privately-owned economic units, etc. However, even if all of 
the above-mentioned transformations had been successfully carried out, one 
would still have to say that such changes are “small transformations”, not 
“great transformations”, according to K.Polanyi’s (Polanyi, 1944; see, also 
Lengyel-Rostoványi, 2001) interpretation. In the case of Serbia, one should 
recall that the basic “tone” of all political and social developments originated 
from “battles” for “national interests”. Unless such “battles” are reconsidered, 
unless policy failures and those responsible for them are revealed, it is 
practically impossible to rebuild new societal strategies for the future of 
Serbia and to “leave behind” the sinister years of ‘resolving’ social crises; 
that is, the years of the destruction of Serbian society during the 1990s.
The new political forces in Serbia have tended to postpone the questioning of 
the “national agenda” of the 1990s, thus pushing themselves into an awkward 
and contradictory situation: on the one hand, these new political forces have 
established cooperative relations with the institutions of the “international 
community”, including cooperating with the Hague tribunal, regaining, in 
return, the respect and credibility of those “foreign factors”; on the other 
hand, partly because of their cooperative approach toward the “international 
community” these new governing powers have lost the credibility and support 
of their citizens. Since a considerable number of Serbian citizens question its 
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legitimacy and credibility, the new government was incapable of completely 
mobilizing all its disposable resources and of improving economic conditions 
in the country. It became clear that “ethno-national” issues would not be 
provisionally swept under the carpet for “tactical reasons”. This kind of 
“social engineering”, de facto, brings back the bad years of the 1990s; the 
discrepancy between the existing Constitution and the new social reality is 
maintained, contributing to the creation of inconsistent legal rules, which 
must be disrespected, thus leading to a situation of a destroyed society that is 
characterized by the negation of legal regulation as the key mode of keeping 
social order in modern societies. 
Before the Serbian society achieves maturity in addressing the difficult issues 
of the “Serbian national program”, a national program which is sufficiently 
different from the “program” that actors attempted to implement during the 
1990s (but again, a program that will rebuild a sufficient consensus between 
the “masses” and their elites) is required to create a new “leap forward” and 
the reconstitution of society. Without this, Serbia faces a continuing blockade 
of its “post-socialist transformation”, a limited scope of democratization and 
modernization, a loss of attractiveness to its own citizens; and even more, a 
reduction in its attractiveness to the rest of the modern world.
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